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Abstract
We study optimal incentive contracts for workers who are recipro-
cal to management attention. When neither worker’s effort nor man-
ager’s attention can be contracted, a double moral-hazard problem
arises, implying that reciprocal workers should be given weak finan-
cial incentives. In a multiple-agent setting, this problem can be re-
solved using promotion incentives. We test these predictions using
German Socio-Economic Panel data. We find that workers who are
more reciprocal are significantly more likely to receive promotion in-
centives, while there is no such relation for individual bonus pay.
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1 Introduction
The birth of modern management theory is often related to the Hawthorne
studies (Roethlisberger and Dickson 1939). A well-known case among so-
cial scientists, in the Hawthorne plant researchers experimented with light
intensity and examined its effect on worker’s productivity. To their surprise,
workers reacted favorably to both increases and decreases of light intensity.
The conclusion of the researchers was that workers simply liked the atten-
tion of management and responded by increasing effort. This may come as no
surprise to most organizational scholars today, but in the times of Taylorian
scientific management with its job specialization and monetary incentives,
such findings caused heated debate.
To a large extent, the debate on the importance of monetary incentives
and other, non-monetary tools of management in motivating workers contin-
ues today. In economics, agency theory is characterized by a strong empha-
sis on monetary incentives. This is not without reason: the importance of
monetary incentives for workers’ motivation is confirmed in many empirical
studies, see Prendergast (1999) for an overview. Strong motivational effects
of monetary incentives are also found in recent field experiments (see, among
others, Lazear 2000, Shearer 2004, and Bandiera et al. 2005).
However, monetary incentives are often not considered as the most im-
portant motivator by workers and managers. Many workers consider task
enjoyment and moral concerns as stronger motivators than monetary incen-
tives (Minkler 2004). In a study on managers’ use of motivational tools,
Agell (2004) reports that more than 60% of managers in Sweden use ‘good
management-worker relations’ to a great or fairly great extent. In contrast,
even in the sector where performance-related pay is most common (skilled
services), only 17% of managers use performance pay as a motivational tool
to a great or fairly great extent. Likewise, Campbell and Kamlani (1997)
find that compensation executives in the US rank good management-worker
relationships much higher than wages, working conditions, and supervision
as determinants of workers’ effort.
In line with these surveys, studies in organizational behavior (OB) stress
the importance of so-called leader-member exchange relationships (LMX)
and perceived supervisor support (PSS) for workers’ motivation. A large
number of empirical studies find a positive effect of the perceived quality of
the management-employee relation on employee’s performance, e.g. Nagin et
al. (2002), Graafland and Rutten (2004), Pazy and Ganzach (2008), Freeman
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et al. (2007), Kamdar and Van Dyne (2007) and Shanock and Eisenberger
(2006). Moreover, several studies find that better relations between man-
agers and employees lead to higher job satisfaction and/or reduced turnover
intentions, see e.g. Gagnon and Michael (2004), Babin and Boles (1996), and
Wayne et al. (1997). In line with these findings, empirical work also suggests
that firms with bad management-worker relationships are penalized in that
they need to pay higher wages to attract and retain workers (Pfeffer 1998,
Gittell 2003, Borzaga and Depedri 2005).
This paper reconciles these two views on workers’ motivation by devel-
oping a formal agency model that incorporates the OB tools of management
and monetary incentives. We picture a firm where workers exert effort and
managers, in addition to incentive pay, use non-monetary tools of manage-
ment (attention, praise, recognition, et cetera). We make two important
assumptions about these non-monetary tools, which are inspired by the em-
pirical studies mentioned above. First, applying these tools of management
— which we call manager’s attention — raises worker’s well-being but comes
at a cost for the manager. Second, we assume that management attention
reduces worker’s marginal cost of effort, implying that effort increases with
attention. In our model, the reason is worker’s reciprocity: workers recipro-
cate management attention by providing effort. In this setting, we study the
optimal provision of incentive pay for workers, the manager’s incentive to ap-
ply non-monetary tools of management, and the resulting worker’s behavior
and productivity.
One of our key objects of study is the issue of ‘congruence’, important
in management science, but not often studied in organizational economics.
The idea is that the set up of one element of organization affects the working
of other parts (see, e.g., Nadler and Tushman 1997). We argue that the
strength of monetary incentives given to workers affects the extent to which
managers use their other motivational tools. In particular, we will show
that, when neither worker’s effort nor management activities are contractible,
incentive pay for workers weakens the incentive for managers to motivate
workers through attention. The reason is that, by paying a larger share of
output to the worker, there is less output at stake for the manager, which
dilutes his incentives to support the worker. Optimal performance pay for
the worker therefore strikes a balance between motivating the worker to exert
effort and preserving incentives for the manager to apply his non-monetary
management tools. Our analysis thus predicts that managers will be careful
with introducing or raising incentive pay for workers, and particularly so for
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workers who are most responsive to management attention. In equilibrium,
worker’s effort and manager’s attention are both suboptimally low compared
to the first-best.
These results change when the manager employs multiple workers do-
ing comparable tasks. Following Carmichael (1983)’s analysis of the ‘agent-
agents problem,’ we show that first-best profits can then be achieved through
promotion incentives for workers. The reason is that, in contrast to individual
performance pay, promotion incentives do not interfere with the manager’s
incentive to give attention. This benefit of promotion incentives is particu-
larly large when workers are highly responsive to manager’s attention.
The main predictions of our theoretical analysis are thus twofold: workers
who are more responsive to manager’s attention are less likely to receive in-
dividual performance pay and more likely to receive promotion incentives.
We test both these predictions using the German Socio-Economic Panel
(GSOEP), which contains data on compensation schemes and reciprocity
for more than 2700 German workers. While we find no support for the for-
mer hypothesis, there is strong support for the latter: Worker’s reciprocity
significantly increases the likelihood of receiving promotion incentives. More-
over, this only holds for nonunion workers and for workers with sufficiently
high income, which — as we shall see — is well in line with our theory.
We proceed as follows. The following section gives a brief overview of
related literature. Next we introduce in section 3 our basic model. Section 4,
5, and 6 analyze optimal contracts and the resulting manager’s and worker’s
behavior in the first-best, the second-best with full rent extraction, and the
second-best with limited-liability protection, respectively. Section 7 extends
the analysis to allow for multiple agents and promotion incentives. Section
8 describes the results of our empirical analysis. Section 9 concludes.
2 Related literature
The economic literature on manager-subordinate reciprocity has so far been
confined to monetary gift-exchange. Starting with Akerlof (1982), economists
have argued that paying generous wages may trigger effort and loyalty as
workers feel a need to reciprocate the employer’s gift. Numerous laboratory
experiments have provided support for this monetary gift-exchange relation
(an early study is Fehr, Kirchsteiger, and Riedl 1993; Fehr and Gächter 2000
provide an overview of the voluminous literature). Recent field studies, how-
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ever, are less supportive. In various natural workplace settings, Gneezy and
List (2006), List (2006), Kube et al. (2006, 2008), Al-Ubaydli et al. (2007),
and Hennig-Schmidt et al. (2008) find only limited support for monetary
gift-exchange.
Scholars in management science and organizational sociology have stressed
the importance of non-monetary or social gift-exchange between managers
and workers. A rich body of empirical research in organizational behavior
(OB) has investigated the effect of social exchange between managers and
workers on workers’ performance. In addition to the studies already men-
tioned in the introduction, many studies have found that a higher quality of
so-called ‘leader-member exchange relationships’ (LMX) and ‘perceived su-
pervisor support’ (PSS) are associated with better performance of the worker,
both in required duties as well as in those beyond the formal employment
contract (see e.g. Settoon et al. 1996, Wayne et al. 1997, and Dabos and
Rousseau 2004).
The main contribution of our paper is to incorporate social exchange as a
management tool into an otherwise standard agency model, which allows us
to study social exchange and several forms of incentive pay in one unifying
framework. Compared to agency theory and motivation in organizational
economics, we extend existing models by enriching the action space of the
principal/manager to include the OB tools of management and by adding
a non-monetary motivation of the agent/worker to exert effort. While the
former innovation is a unique feature of our analysis,1 there are by now many
other economic studies allowing workers to care about more than just money
and effort, see e.g. Francois (2000, 2007), Benabou and Tirole (2003), Akerlof
and Kranton (2005), Besley and Ghatak (2005), Ellingsen and Johannesson
(2008), Delfgaauw and Dur (2008), and Dur and Glazer (2008).
Closest to our paper is Englmaier and Leider (2008)’s recent study on the
implications of reciprocity for the employment relation. Their key result is
that reciprocal motivations and performance-based pay are substitutes, as in
section 5 and 6 of this paper. Their analysis strongly differs from ours, how-
ever. One crucial difference is that they confine their analysis to monetary
gift-exchange, whereas we focus on social gift-exchange. Specifically, in their
model, the principal is a passive contract-writer, inducing reciprocity by leav-
ing a rent for the agent. In our model, feelings of reciprocity are engendered
1In a related paper, we study social exchange and incentive provision in a common
agency context, see Dur and Roelfsema (2007).
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by the principal’s attention. Another difference is that in Englmaier and
Leider, the agent is risk-averse and has a discrete action space, whereas we
consider a risk-neutral agent and continuous effort choices. Finally, we have
a different approach in the empirical verification of our results. They provide
empirical support by comparing the organizational form and pay structure
between firms who supposedly select workers on reciprocity and those that
do not. By contrast, we use the individual worker as the unit of analysis,
using a direct measure of an individual’s reciprocity.
Our paper builds on a rich body of literature that studies optimal con-
tracts in the presence of double moral-hazard (e.g. Carmichael 1983, Demski
and Sappington 1991, Gupta and Romano 1998, and Agrawal 2002), with
applications in the context of agriculture (Eswaran and Kotwal 1985), re-
sale price maintenance (Romano 1994), product warranties (Kambhu 1982,
Cooper and Ross 1985, Mann and Wissink 1988), and franchising (Lal 1990,
Bhattacharyya and Lafontaine 1995). The latter application is especially in-
teresting, because some serious efforts have been made to empirically verify
the theoretical predictions. Lafontaine (1992) finds that franchising con-
tracts “are most consistent with a model based on two sided-moral hazard”
(p. 263). Agrawal and Lal (1995) find “support for the hypothesis that roy-
alty rate balances the incentives to the franchisor to invest in brand name
with those to the franchisees to invest in retail service” (p. 213). Similar
findings are reported by Sen (1993) and Wimmer and Garen (1997). Other
empirical studies on double moral-hazard include Allen and Lueck (1992) in
the field of agricultural contracts, Golosinski and West (1995) in the context
of shopping center development, and Hainz and Kleimeier (2004) on project
finance. We differ from this literature in our focus on social exchange and
workers’ motivation. Further, we are the first to provide some evidence for
the relevance of double moral-hazard in the workplace.
3 The model
We consider a risk-neutral principal employing a risk-neutral agent. The
principal’s expected payoff E(π) is described by:
E(π) = eH + (1− e)L− (w + eb)− 1
2
ρa2, (1)
where e is effort exerted by the agent, H and L are the two possible output
values (high and low; H > L), w is the agent’s base salary, b is a bonus paid
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to the agent in case output is high, ρ > 0 is a cost parameter, and a denotes
the principal’s attention given to the agent. The probability that output is
high is increasing in the agent’s effort and, for simplicity, given by e where
e ∈ [0, 1]. Throughout, we shall impose restrictions on the parameter values
such that we can rule out solutions where e < 0 or e > 1. Besides offering
a contract describing the agent’s base salary and bonus pay, the principal
engages in giving attention to the agent. We assume that giving attention
is costly for the principal. Allowing for some intrinsic benefits from giving
attention would not change the results qualitatively.
The agent’s expected utility E(U) is:
E(U) = w + eb+ γea− 1
2
θe2, (2)
where the first two terms are the agent’s expected wage income and the last
term represents the agent’s cost of effort, θ > 0. A distinguishing feature of
our model is the interaction term γea, where γ ≥ 0. This term captures the
observations discussed in the introduction that the agent’s marginal costs of
effort are decreasing and the worker’s well-being is increasing in the attention
given by the principal. Attention can be interpreted as kindness that evokes
feelings of reciprocity, but can also be interpreted as support by the principal
which helps the agent to perform his tasks. We shall call γ the agent’s
reciprocity parameter.
The timing of the game is as follows. First, the principal writes a con-
tract which the agent accepts if his expected utility is equal to or exceeds
his reservation utility U . In the second stage the principal decides on his
attention level. Finally, the agent chooses his effort level, after observing the
attention provided by the principal. The implications of some alternative
time structures and richer action sets are briefly discussed in the concluding
remarks.
4 First-best contract
Let us first consider the case where both attention and effort are contractible.
Full contractibility implies that there is no reason to pay a bonus conditional
on output on top of the base salary, and so we impose b = 0 in this section.
Thus, the principal designs a contract consisting of attention a, effort e, and
base salary w, that maximizes his expected payoff given by (1), and takes
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into account the agent’s participation constraint E(U) ≥ U , where E(U) is
given by (2).2 The first-order conditions are:
−ρa+ λγe = 0, (3)
H − L+ λ (γa− θe) = 0, (4)
−1 + λ = 0,
w + γea− 1
2
θe2 = U,
where λ is the Lagrange-multiplier and the last equality follows from the
third first-order condition which implies that λ > 0. The first-best contract
simply equates the marginal benefits and costs of attention, and likewise for
effort. Further, the principal pays a base salary such that the agent is just
willing to accept the contract. The second-order conditions are satisfied if
θρ − γ2 > 0, or γ <
√
θρ. In the remainder of this paper, we will assume
that this condition holds. If it is violated, first-best effort and attention are
infinite.
Solving for λ we can rewrite the first-order conditions for attention and
effort into:
a =
γe
ρ
, (5)
e =
H − L+ γa
θ
. (6)
Note that attention is increasing in effort and vice versa. In other words,
attention and effort are complements. Solving by substitution we obtain the
first-best levels of attention and effort:
aFB =
γ
θρ− γ2 (H − L), (7)
eFB =
ρ
θρ− γ2 (H − L). (8)
For an interior solution e ∈ [0, 1] it must hold that θρ−γ2 ≥ ρ(H−L). As can
be seen from (7) and (8), a change in ρ, θ, (H −L), or γ affects the optimal
values of both attention and effort. This stems from the complementarity
between attention and effort. Obviously, both attention and effort increase
2Clearly, in this case of full contractibility, maximizing the joint surplus would give
identical results.
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with the marginal product of effort, H − L. It is also clear that attention
decreases with the principal’s cost of giving attention, reflected by ρ, and
increases with the reciprocity of the agent, γ. Likewise, effort decreases with
the agent’s cost of providing effort, θ, and increases with his reciprocity, γ.
The principal’s cost of giving attention ρ affects the agent’s effort through its
effect on attention provided by the principal: When ρ becomes larger, less
attention is paid to the worker and as a consequence of the higher marginal
cost of effort, effort decreases. In a similar way, the cost of effort θ negatively
affects the principal’s attention by decreasing the agent’s effort.
5 Incomplete contract with full rent extrac-
tion
Next consider the situation where neither attention nor effort are contractible.
Hence, in order to induce the agent to exert effort, the principal may find it
optimal to offer bonus pay conditional on high output in addition to the base
salary. This section abstracts from limited-liability protection of the agent,
which is studied in the next section. Here we allow the base salary and the
bonus to take any value, provided that the agent’s participation constraint,
E(U) ≥ U , is satisfied. We solve for a subgame perfect equilibrium by back-
ward induction. So, we start with the agent’s effort choice, next we study
the principal’s choice of attention, and finally we consider optimal contract
design.
The agent’s optimal effort given the level of attention and the wage con-
tract solves
max
e
w + eb+ γea− 1
2
θe2.
The first-order condition for optimal effort implies:
e =
b+ γa
θ
. (9)
Obviously, the higher the bonus and the lower the costs of exerting effort,
the higher the agent’s effort. Comparing (9) with (6) gives the usual result
that, for a given a, the agent chooses first-best effort when the bonus equals
the full marginal product (b = H − L). Note also that the agent’s effort
increases with the principal’s attention, and the more so, the more reciprocal
the agent is.
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The principal takes this relationship between e and a into account when
choosing his level of attention. His problem is to solve
max
a
eH + (1− e)L− (w + eb)− 1
2
ρa2, (10)
where e is described by (9). The first-order condition is:
de
da
(H − L− b)− ρa = 0. (11)
Rewriting using (9) gives optimal attention:
a =
γ
θρ
(H − L− b), (12)
which increases with the marginal product and with the agent’s reciprocity,
and decreases with the cost parameters. Moreover, equation (12) shows a
clear negative relation between attention and the agent’s bonus pay. The
intuition for this result can be seen from the first-order condition (11). In
the second stage of the game, the principal’s only reason for giving attention
is to stimulate effort. An increase in the bonus b reduces the principal’s
marginal payoff from the agent’s effort. In the extreme case that b = H −L,
the full marginal product from effort accrues to the agent. In this case, no
attention will be given, because there is nothing at stake for the principal.
Another extreme case is b = 0, in which case all gains from extra effort accrue
to the principal, and so giving attention is very attractive. Still, however,
attention is below the first-best level, which is easily verified by comparing
(7) and (12). The reason is that, after the contract has been signed, the
principal only takes his own welfare into account and does not care about
the positive effect his attention has on the agent’s utility. To reach first-best
attention, the bonus should actually be negative.3 By means of a negative
bonus, the agent’s welfare is fully internalized by the principal in the second
stage of the game.
Anticipating the behavior of the principal and the agent in stage two and
three of the game as defined by equations (9) and (12), the principal writes a
3Specifically, using (7) and (12), it follows that a = aFB if
b =
− (H − L) γ2
(θρ− γ2) < 0.
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profit-maximizing contract in the first stage by choosing w and b, taking into
account the agent’s participation constraint E(U) ≥ U . The maximization
problem is
max
b,w
eH + (1− e)L− (w + eb)− 1
2
ρa2 (13)
s.t. E(U) ≥ U
which leads to the following first-order conditions:
−e+
µ
de
db
+
de
da
da
db
¶
(H − L− b)− da
db
ρa
+λ
µ
e+
µ
de
db
+
de
da
da
db
¶
(b+ γa− θe) + da
db
γe
¶
= 0, (14)
−1 + λ = 0, (15)
w + eb+ γea− 1
2
θe2 = U, (16)
where the equality in (16) follows from (15) which implies that λ > 0. Solving
for λ, we can simplify (14) into:µ
de
db
+
de
da
da
db
¶
(H − L+ γa− θe)− da
db
(ρa− γe) = 0. (17)
Compared to (14), the terms related to the payment of the bonus have dis-
appeared, as changes in the expected bonus payment are fully compensated
by a change in the base salary the agent receives. Hence, the optimal level
of the bonus is completely determined by its effects on behavior, both of the
principal and of the agent. As we have seen, a higher bonus implies higher
effort for a given level of attention (see equation (9)), but leads to a reduc-
tion in attention (see equation (12)), which in turn reduces effort. Overall,
effort increases in the bonus,4 while attention decreases. Hence, incentiviz-
ing the agent to exert effort diminishes the principal’s own incentives to give
attention: the double moral-hazard problem bites.
4This can be easily verified by substituting (12) into (9) which results in:
e =
b(θρ− γ2) + γ2(H − L)
θ2ρ
. (18)
Taking into account the restriction that γ <
√
θρ (which ensures finite attention and effort
in the first-best), it follows that dedb +
de
da
da
db > 0.
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Applying the envelop theorem using (9) and (11), we can rewrite condition
(17) into:
de
db
(H − L− b) + da
db
γe = 0. (19)
This expression clearly reveals the trade-off the principal faces when writ-
ing the contract. The bonus has a positive effect on effort, which increases
profits as long as b < H − L. On the other hand, the bonus reduces the
amount of attention provided, which reduces the agent’s utility by γe. In
the contracting stage, the principal cares about agent’s utility because it is
ultimately reflected in the base salary. Thus, when choosing the bonus, the
principal trades off effort and agent’s happiness.5
Substituting the expressions for effort and attention (equations (9) and
(12), respectively) into the first-order condition (19) and noting that de/db =
1/θ and da/db = −γ/θρ, we obtain the following expression for the optimal
bonus:
b∗ =
¡
θ2ρ2 − γ4
¢
(H − L)
θ2ρ2 − γ4 + γ2θρ
. (20)
First it should be noted that in order to satisfy the second-order condition,
the denominator must be positive. Given our condition that γ <
√
θρ, this
condition is always satisfied. Inspection of (20) reveals that this also implies
that the optimal bonus is smaller than the marginal product of effort, ex-
cept when γ = 0. The intuition behind this result follows from our previous
discussion. For positive γ, it is optimal to set the bonus smaller than the
marginal product, because the principal wants to commit himself to give at
least some attention. The reason is that attention increases agent’s hap-
piness, and therefore enables the principal to reduce the base salary. This
increase in agent’s happiness comes at the cost of lower effort, because effort
is increasing in the bonus. Thus, the optimal bonus is a compromise between
the agent’s incentives to put in effort and the principal’s incentive to give
attention.
It can easily be verified using (20) that the optimal bonus decreases in the
agent’s reciprocity γ. There are three reasons for this. First, the larger the
5Note that the principal’s costs of attention and the effect of attention on the agent’s
effort do not directly affect the level of the optimal bonus which follows from applying
the envelop theorem. The reason is that the principal equates these marginal benefits and
costs of attention in the second stage of the game.
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agent’s reciprocity parameter γ, the larger the marginal effect of attention
on agent’s utility, and hence the more attractive to increase attention at the
cost of effort. Second, the larger γ , the more responsive the agent’s effort is
to attention (see equation (9)), which in turn makes the principal’s attention
more responsive to the bonus (see equation (12)). The third reason is more
subtle: the larger γ, the higher is effort for given bonus. Because the value of
attention is increasing in effort, it is attractive to increase attention in order
to profit from the larger marginal effect of attention on the agent’s utility.
By inserting equation (20) into equations (9) and (12), we obtain the
levels of attention and effort that result under the optimal contract:
a∗ =
γ3(H − L)
γ2θρ− γ4 + θ2ρ2
, (21)
e∗ =
θρ2(H − L)
γ2θρ− γ4 + θ2ρ2
. (22)
Comparing a∗ with aFB described by equation (7), it is clear that a∗ < aFB
when γ > 0. Likewise, comparing e∗ with eFB described by equation (8),
it follows that effort is lower than first-best for positive values of γ, i.e.
e∗ < eFB. Clearly, the problem of having only one instrument (the bonus)
for two conflicting goals (incentivizing the agent and the principal) implies
that both attention and effort are suboptimally low. In the specific case where
γ = 0, providing attention is of no avail, and so there is one instrument (the
bonus) for one goal (optimizing effort), implying that the first-best can be
reached.
It is also interesting to make a comparison between the comparative sta-
tics of the first-best case and the incomplete contract case. We saw in the
previous section that in the first-best, both attention and effort rise with the
agent’s reciprocity. While this still holds for attention, the effect of a change
in γ on optimal effort is no longer always positive:
de∗
dγ
=
2γθρ2 (2γ2 − θρ) (H − L)¡
θ2ρ2 − γ4 + γ2θρ
¢2 ≶ 0, (23)
which is negative for γ <
q
1
2
ρθ and positive for γ >
q
1
2
ρθ. As can be easily
verified, optimal behavior in the third and second stage implies that effort
increases in γ, but for small values of γ this is offset by a reduction in the
bonus specified in the first stage.
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To summarize, we have seen that there is a trade-off between monetary
incentives and attention provision by the principal, stemming from a dou-
ble moral-hazard problem. The trade-off implies that agents who are more
reciprocal should be given weaker individual performance incentives. By do-
ing so, the principal commits to provide attention, which raises the agent’s
happiness, and hence allows the principal to lower the base salary.
6 Incomplete contract with limited liability
In this section we consider the case where the agent is protected by limited
liability: the agent’s compensation must at least be equal to w. As we
shall see, the optimal bonus b is never negative, and so the limited-liability
constraint is only binding in case of low output; that is, when the worker
only receives his base salary. Hence, the limited-liability constraint implies
a constraint on the base salary only: w ≥ w. We shall assume that the
minimum compensation w is sufficiently high so that the agent’s participation
constraint E(U) ≥ U is not binding.6
Solving the game proceeds in a similar way as in the full-rent-extraction
case. The results for the third and second stage are identical. Hence, effort
and attention are described by (9) and (12), respectively. The outcome of the
contracting stage under limited-liability differs, however, from the full-rent-
extraction case. Consequently, the equilibrium values of effort and attention
are different as well. The problem in the first stage is:
max
b,w
eH + (1− e)L− (w + eb)− 1
2
ρa2
s.t. w ≥ w. (24)
The following first-order conditions describe the optimal contract:
−e+
µ
de
db
+
de
da
da
db
¶
(H − L− b)− da
db
ρa = 0,
−1 + λ = 0,
w = w.
6For brevity, we abstract from the case where both the participation constraint and
the limited-liability constraint are binding. The main results of this section carry over to
this case, however.
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Combining these conditions gives (after applying the envelop theorem):
de
db
(H − L− b)− e = 0. (25)
Comparing this condition with the full-rent-extraction case (19) provides
us with some important insights into how the trade-offs differ between the
two cases. In the full-rent-extraction case, the principal trades off agent’s
utility and incentives to provide effort. The binding participation constraint
makes it optimal for the principal to take the agent’s welfare into account,
because the agent’s welfare is reflected in the base salary. In contrast, when
the limited-liability constraint is binding, bonus pay and attention do not
reduce the base salary (which is fixed at w), but increase the agent’s rent.
From first-order condition (25), we see that the bonus stimulates effort, but
giving a bonus is costly because the principal cannot reduce the base salary.
The principal therefore trades off giving incentives to the agent and leaving
a rent to the agent. The principal optimally increases financial incentives
until the marginal benefits of stimulating effort do no longer outweigh the
marginal costs. Note that attention does not play a role in the determination
of the optimal bonus. The reason is that increases in attention resulting from
decreases in the bonus not only stimulate effort, but also increase the costs
of giving attention. Because the principal equates the marginal costs and
benefits of giving attention in the second stage, these effects exactly cancel
in the contract design stage.
Solving the first-order conditions leads to the following expressions for
bonus, attention, and effort:
b∗ =
θρ− γ2
2θρ− γ2 (H − L) , (26)
a∗ =
γ
2θρ− γ2 (H − L) , (27)
e∗ =
ρ
2θρ− γ2 (H − L) . (28)
The second-order condition requires that γ <
√
2θρ, which always holds given
our restriction that γ <
√
θρ. The bonus is always lower than the marginal
product (H − L), because of the trade-off between effort and rents discussed
above. Note that when γ = 0, the optimal bonus is exactly half of the mar-
ginal product. Again, the bonus is decreasing in the agent’s reciprocity γ, but
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for a completely different reason than in the full-rent-extraction case. When
the agent is more reciprocally inclined, effort increases for given values of
attention and bonus pay. Therefore, the probability that the bonus actually
has to be paid is higher, implying that providing a bonus is a more costly
instrument when workers are more reciprocal (see Besley and Ghatak 2005
for a similar argument in the context of motivated workers). Hence, the opti-
mal bonus decreases in agent’s reciprocity. Compared to the first-best levels,
attention and effort are always suboptimally low. Attention is suboptimally
low because the principal only provides attention to stimulate effort and does
not take the beneficial effects of attention on the agent’s utility into account
when deciding on the bonus. Combining the observations that the bonus is
at most half of the marginal product and that attention is suboptimally low,
it is clear that effort is also below first-best.
It is interesting to compare the levels of attention, effort, and bonus pay
in the limited-liability case with those in the full-rent-extraction case. As ex-
plained above, the crucial difference between the two cases is that the bonus
is not any longer a costless instrument because the base salary cannot be
adjusted when expected bonus pay changes. Therefore, for γ = 0, the bonus
is only half of what the bonus would be in the full-rent-extraction case, and
is smaller for all relevant values of γ, i.e. 0 ≤ γ <
√
θρ. Given the nega-
tive relation between the bonus and attention, the relatively small bonus in
the limited-liability case implies that more attention is provided than in the
full-rent-extraction case. Effort is nevertheless smaller than in the full-rent-
extraction case, because of the lower bonus. Lastly, it is interesting to note
that the relation between effort and agent’s reciprocity γ changes qualita-
tively: instead of the U-shape in the full-rent-extraction case, effort is now
strictly increasing in γ. This results from the smaller bonus in the limited-
liability case, which implies that attention and effort react more strongly to
changes in γ.
7 Promotion incentives
This section examines the possibility of overcoming the double moral-hazard
problem identified in the previous sections through provision of promotion
incentives (or relative performance pay). Clearly, for this to be feasible,
the principal must employ at least two agents. For convenience, suppose
the principal hires two identical agents, denoted by index numbers 1 and
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2, who perform identical tasks. The agents compete for a single promotion
prize, which is denoted by P . We assume that the agent who achieves highest
output wins the prize P . In case of equal outputs, a random draw determines
the winner. Thus, the probability of winning the prize for agent 1 is given
by 1
2
(1 + e1 − e2).7 Expected utility for agent 1 is described by:
E(U1) = w + e1b+
1
2
(1 + e1 − e2)P + γe1a1 −
1
2
θe21, (29)
where the subscripts denote attention given to and effort provided by the
indicated agent. The principal’s payoff is described by
E(π) = (H − L− b) (e1 + e2) + 2L− (2w + P )−
1
2
ρ(a1 + a2)2. (30)
Note that the cost of the promotion prize does not depend on effort, because
the principal awards the prize to one of the agents independent of the levels
of output.
First consider the case where the participation constraint is binding. The
analysis proceeds in the same way as in the two previous sections. Opti-
mal third-stage behavior follows from the maximization of the agent’s utility
function (29) which results in:
e1 =
b+ 1
2
P + γa1
θ
; e2 =
b+ 1
2
P + γa2
θ
. (31)
These expressions are similar to our earlier findings (see equation (9)); the
difference is that the agent is now also motivated by the possibility of winning
the promotion prize P .
Optimal behavior in the second stage follows from maximization of the
principal’s payoff function (30) with respect to a1 and a2. Assuming that the
principal gives the same level of attention to each of the two agents,8 optimal
7Note that the chance of winning the prize for agent 1 is:
e1(1− e2) +
1
2
e1e2 +
1
2
(1− e1) (1− e2)
which can be simplified to the expression in the main text.
8It is easy to verify that in our set-up the distribution of a given level of attention over
the agents does not influence agents’ total effort and, hence, the principal’s profits in the
second stage of the game. Obviously, if agent’s responsiveness to attention would decrease
in the level of attention, it would be profit-maximizing to distribute attention evenly, as
we assume.
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attention provision is given by:
a1 = a2 =
γ
2θρ
(H − L− b) . (32)
Equations (31) and (32) already make clear that the double moral-hazard
problem can be solved by using relative performance pay. The promotion
prize P incentivizes the agents, but does not impair the principal’s incentives
to give attention. Therefore, it is possible to set the bonus b such that the
principal’s incentives to provide attention are optimal, whereas the promotion
prize P provides the agents with monetary incentives to put in effort. Since
the participation constraint is binding, and using that e1 = e2 = e and
a1 = a2 = a in equilibrium, the principal’s problem can be written as follows:
max
b,P,w
2 (H − L− b) e+ 2L− (2w + P )− 1
2
ρ(2a)2 (33)
s.t. U ≥ U.
The first-order conditions are:
−2e+ 2
µ
de
db
+
de
da
da
db
¶
(H − L− b)− da
db
ρ4a
+λ
µ
e+
µ
de
db
+
de
da
da
db
¶
(b+ γa− θe) + da
db
γe
¶
= 0,
de
dP
2 (H − L− b)− 1 + λ
µ
de
dP
(b+ γa− θe) + 1
2
¶
= 0,
−2 + λ = 0,
w +
1
2
P + eb+ γea− 1
2
θe2 = U,
where the last equality follows from the third first-order condition, implying
λ > 0. Solving for λ and applying the envelop theorem using (31) and (32),
we can solve for the optimal bonus and promotion prize:
b∗ =
µ
1− 2θρ
2θρ− γ2
¶
(H − L),
P ∗ =
4θρ
2θρ− γ2 (H − L).
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Clearly, when γ > 0, it is optimal for the principal to offer promotion incen-
tives to the agents along with negative individual incentive pay. Given our
previous discussion in section 5 on what bonus level leads to first-best atten-
tion, this result is not surprising. In the second stage, the principal does not
take the agent’s welfare into account. Therefore, in order to internalize this
externality, the principal sets a negative bonus. This obviously gives per-
verse monetary incentives to the agents, but this is corrected for by offering
the promotion prize. By substituting the expressions for the optimal bonus
and promotion prize into the equations for effort and attention (equations
(31) and (32) respectively), it is easily verified that the first-best is reached.9
As before, the bonus is decreasing in γ. The reason is that the size of the
externality increases in γ, requiring a lower bonus to reach first-best atten-
tion. Consequently, promotion incentives are also increasing in the agent’s
reciprocity so as to restore incentives to exert effort.
Next consider the case where the limited-liability constraint is binding.
It is easy to verify that, in this case, the principal optimally sets the same
bonus as in section 6 (corrected for the number of agents) and does not use
relative performance pay. The reason is twofold. First, the problem that
relative performance pay resolves in case the agent’s participation constraint
is binding is non-existent when the limited-liability constraint binds. While
relative performance pay enables the principal to credibly commit to high
attention and hence reduce the agent’s base salary when the participation
constraint binds, the principal clearly cannot gain by such a commitment
when the limited-liability constraint binds. Second, under limited-liability,
relative performance pay is a more expensive incentive instrument than bonus
pay. The reason is that in contrast to individual bonus pay, under relative
performance pay the principal always rewards one of the agents (even when
both produce low output), which is costly when the limited-liability con-
straint binds.
9It should be taken into account that with two agents, first-best attention per worker
is given by:
aFB =
(H − L) γ
2θρ− γ2 .
As before, first-best effort is described by:
eFB =
H − L+ γaFB
θ
.
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To summarize this section, the possibility of rewarding agents by relative
performance overcomes the double moral-hazard problem in the full-rent-
extraction case. Because relative performance pay leaves the principal’s in-
centives to provide attention unaffected, a mix of promotion incentives and
individual incentives results in first-best attention and effort. In contrast,
in case a limited-liability constraint is binding, the use of promotion incen-
tives cannot increase profits because the principal cannot recoup the agent’s
happiness gains from increased attention and the promotion prize is less cost-
efficient in motivating agents than individual bonus pay.
8 Empirical analysis
This section tests our theoretical predictions on the relationship between an
employee’s reciprocity and the type of incentive pay offered by his employer.
Unfortunately, our data do not allow us to observe the strength of incentives
workers receive. All that we know is whether workers receive a particular
type of incentive. Therefore, we use our theoretical framework to derive
predictions regarding an individual’s likelihood of receiving a certain type of
incentive scheme.
Our theory makes a clear prediction regarding promotion incentives: All
else equal, workers who are more reciprocal should be more likely to receive
promotion incentives. The reason is that promotion incentives do not dilute
the principal’s incentives to provide attention, and this advantage is particu-
larly important for workers who are more reciprocal. We expect this relation
to be particularly strong for workers in small firms, since then the manager
is more likely to be residual claimant.10 Further, our analysis suggests that
when the limited-liability constraint is binding, the relation will be weaker
because the principal has less reason to care about agent’s welfare. We proxy
for limited-liability in two ways: by union-membership and by low income.
Our theoretical predictions regarding individual bonus incentives are less
clear. On the one hand, bonus pay dilutes the principal’s incentive to provide
attention, implying a negative relation between reciprocity and the likelihood
10If the manager is not a residual claimant, we would still expect some effect as long
as the manager’s income depends on his unit’s profits. In large organizations, a lack of
attention provision at the highest levels (from CEO to middle managers) may trickle-down
to lower levels (from middle managers to workers). Shanock and Eisenberger (2006) find
evidence for such effects.
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of receiving bonus incentives. On the other hand, in our model individual
bonus pay helps to fine-tune promotion incentives, implying that the intro-
duction of a bonus is particularly attractive for reciprocal workers. Therefore,
although a negative relation between reciprocity and bonus incentives would
be most in line with our theory, we cannot rule out a positive relation. All
we can say is that, among workers who do not receive promotion incentives,
workers who are more reciprocally inclined should be less likely to receive
bonus pay, and particularly so in small firms. We do not have a clear predic-
tion on whether this relation is different for unionized or low-income workers:
As we have seen in sections 5 and 6, our theory predicts a negative relation
between bonus pay and a worker’s reciprocity both when the limited-liability
constraint is binding and when it is non-binding.
We thus test the following hypotheses:
1. Workers who are more reciprocal are more likely to receive promotion
incentives.
2. The relationship in hypothesis 1 is particularly strong for workers in
small firms.
3. The relationship in hypothesis 1 is weaker for unionized workers and
for workers with low income.
4. Among workers who do not receive promotion incentives, workers who
are more reciprocal are less likely to receive bonus incentives.
5. The relationship in hypothesis 4 is particularly strong for workers in
small firms.
For this analysis we make use of the 2004 and 2005 waves of the Ger-
man Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP), a survey representative for the Ger-
man population.11 This dataset is unique in that it contains data on both
worker’s performance pay and worker’s reciprocity. Reciprocity is measured
by asking how well each of the three following statements applies: (1) If
someone does me a favor, I am prepared to return it; (2) I go out of my
way to help somebody who has been kind to me before; (3) I am ready to
undergo personal costs to help somebody who helped me before. The extent
of agreement with these statements is indicated on a 7-point scale, where
11Detailed information about the GSOEP can be found at www.diw.de/gsoep/.
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1 indicates profound disagreement and 7 means that the statement applies
perfectly. Following Dohmen et al. (2006), we construct a measure of reci-
procity by taking the average score on the three statements.12 Our dependent
variable (the worker’s performance pay) is measured by asking whether peo-
ple’s job performance is regularly assessed by a supervisor and whether this
performance evaluation has consequences for promotion and/or for receiving
a yearly bonus. A value of 1 indicates a positive answer. In our analysis, we
leave out those individuals who indicate that they do not get performance
evaluation by their supervisor. The reason is that some of these individuals,
although lacking a formal performance evaluation, in fact may receive bonus
or promotion incentives, which we cannot observe in the data.13 We provide
some summary statistics of the two key variables in figure 1 and table 1.
We test the first hypothesis by estimating two Probit-equations, as shown
in the first two columns of table 2.14 The difference between the two equations
is that in the second column, we do not control for firm size, industry, and job
status. In line with hypothesis 1, the coefficient for reciprocity is positive and
statistically significant at the 1% level. Also, the effect of reciprocity is eco-
nomically significant: a 1-point increase on the scale of reciprocity increases
12Dohmen et al. (2006) distinguish between positive reciprocity and negative reciprocity,
where the former refers to the inclination to reciprocate kind acts and the latter to recip-
rocation of unkind acts. Because we consider attention as a gift to the agent, we focus on
positive reciprocity. For further discussion of these measures of reciprocity, see Dohmen
et al. (2006).
13The main conclusions are qualitatively robust for inclusion of individuals who do not
get a performance evaluation. However, the picture often becomes blurred in the sense
that the t-values of the coefficient for the reciprocity variable fall, which is not surprising
if, indeed, some workers who do not get a performance evaluation do receive performance
pay.
14Except for the inclusion of the reciprocity variable, the specification is similar to Grund
and Sliwka (2006), who use the GSOEP data to estimate the effect of worker’s risk attitude
on the likelihood of receiving performance pay. Although the definition of most control
variables will be intuitively clear, some deserve further description. "Risk attitude" is
defined as the willingness to take risks on a scale 0-10, where 0 is extremely risk averse.
"East-Germany" is a dummy taking a value 1 if the place of work is in East-Germany or
East-Berlin, and 0 if the place of work is in West-Germany or West-Berlin. "Firm size"
is the number of employees n, categorized as follows: (1) n < 5 (2) 5 ≤ n < 20, (3)
20 ≤ n < 100, (4) 100 ≤ n < 200, (5) 200 ≤ n < 2000, (6) n ≥ 2000. "Industry" is classi-
fied by one-digit industry code: 1=Agriculture, 2=Energy, 3=Mining, 4=Manufacturing,
5=Construction, 6=Trade, 7=Transport, 8=Bank and Insurance, 9=Services, 10=Other.
Lastly, "Job status" indicates an individual’s occupation and occupational level: Blue
collar worker (5 levels), white collar worker (6 levels) or civil servant (4 levels).
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the probability of getting promotion incentives by more than 5 percentage
points on average (the mean marginal effect follows from multiplying the
coefficient with the appropriate reduction factor). Taking into account the
fact that about 45% of the sample used in the regression gets promotion
incentives, this is quite a large effect. The size of the effect remains highly
significant but reduces somewhat in size when we do not control for firm
size, industry, and job status. This suggests that if sorting mechanisms are
present, they are rather subtle: reciprocal workers do not sort on the basis
of job levels, industries or firm size.
We test the second hypothesis by re-estimating the equations for a sample
of small and large firms. A firm is considered ‘small’ if it has less than 100
employees and ‘large’ if it has 100 employees or more. The results are shown
in columns (3) and (4) of table 2. Clearly, reciprocity has a larger effect on
the probability of receiving promotion incentives in small firms than in large
firms, which is supportive of hypothesis 2. However, the difference between
the coefficients is not statistically significant. A similar picture arises when
we leave out some of the controls and when we replicate the regression for
firms with less than 20 employees (approximately 260 observations).
The third hypothesis is that an individual’s reciprocity has a weaker ef-
fect on the likelihood of receiving promotion incentives if the limited-liability
constraint binds. To test this, we replicate the regressions shown in columns
(1) and (2) of table 2 for the subsample of union members.15 As can be
seen from the first two columns of table 3, the effect of reciprocity is in-
significant, independent of whether we control for firm size, industry, and
job status. Similarly, we also proxy for limited-liability by limiting the sam-
ple to full-time workers earning a low income. The third column of table 3
shows regression results for full-time workers earning a gross monthly labour
15A potential problem is that approximately 70% of workers in Germany is covered by
union bargaining, despite low membership rates. The correlation between membership
and limited-liability may therefore be low. However, union membership may also affect
wages in more subtle ways, specifically through the employees council. Addison et al.
(2007) show that employees councils increase wages, and our data suggest that this effect
may be stronger for union members. Replicating the regressions in table 3 for the sample
of union members in firms where an employees council is present (approximately 500
observations), we find that the coefficient becomes zero (p-level around 0.9). However,
the same regression for the sample of all workers in firms where an employees council
is present replicates the estimates obtained in table 2. This suggests that unions exert
influence through the employees council, but further research is needed to examine this
conjecture.
22
income of less than 1500 euro; the fourth column replicates the regression
for full-time workers earning more. The results are in line with our theoret-
ical prediction. To prevent multicollinearity, we only correct for firm-size,
but adding or dropping controls does not affect the results in any important
way. Moreover, our results are robust for changes in the income categories
considered, although these changes obviously cannot be too large: the stan-
dard error of the reciprocity coefficient decreases in the size of the income
category.16
The fourth hypothesis is that among workers who do not receive pro-
motion incentives, workers who are more reciprocal are less likely to receive
bonus incentives. In the first two columns of table 4, we regress the likelihood
of receiving bonus pay on reciprocity for these workers. Controlling for firm
size, industry, and job status, the coefficient for reciprocity has the predicted
sign but is highly insignificant (see the first column). The significance does
not improve if we drop the controls, as can be seen from the second column
of table 4. Worse still, the coefficient also has the wrong sign. We learn two
things from these regressions. First, just as in the regression of promotion
incentives on reciprocity, sorting seems to play no role. Second, we find no
evidence in favor of hypothesis 4. This somewhat disappointing result may
be attributed to the fifth hypothesis, namely that the negative relationship
between reciprocity and the likelihood of receiving bonus pay is especially
strong in small firms. To examine this possibility, we split the sample into
small and large firms, where 100 employees is again taken as the cut-off point.
The third and fourth column of table 4 show the results. The reciprocity co-
efficients are insignificant and the signs are opposite to our prediction. These
findings are robust for dropping (sets of) controls or considering firms with
less than 20 employees. However, if we include those individuals who get
promotion incentives, the (positive) coefficient for the small firms becomes
significant at the 5% level. This is in line with our theory, because fine-tuning
16Some caution is warranted in drawing inferences from the third column of table 3:
the insignificant coefficient may be due to the limited number of observations included
in the sample, which is even more concerning considering the negative relation between
income and promotion incentives (see table 1). This criticism is not valid for the regression
using the sample of union workers, because they receive promotion incentives even more
frequently than non-union workers, see table 1. Also, any random sample we took of the
population containing approximately 600 observations yields significant results. Therefore,
our results suggest that when a limited-liability constraint binds, the relation between
reciprocity and the likelihood of receiving promotion incentives becomes weaker.
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the incentive structure using individual bonus pay is particularly attractive
when workers are reciprocal.
To conclude this section, we found evidence in line with hypotheses 1-3
concerning the likelihood of receiving promotion incentives. Our empirical
findings for hypotheses 4 and 5 regarding the probability of receiving bonus
pay do not support our theoretical predictions.
9 Concluding remarks
We have analyzed how incentives for a worker and his superior interact us-
ing a gift-exchange model where the worker is reciprocal to attention of his
superior. In our model, attention is the superior’s input in the exchange
relation, whereas the worker reciprocates with higher effort. This reciprocity
directly links the inputs of a manager to that of his worker, so that produc-
tion becomes a joint effort. We have studied a common trade-off in models
of double moral-hazard, where stronger incentives for one of the partners
may weaken those for the other. The central result is that bonus pay for
the worker weakens the incentives for his superior to provide attention. We
have seen that promotion incentives are particularly helpful when workers are
reciprocal, since it takes away the commitment problem for the superior in
providing attention. This last result is supported by data from the German
Socio-Economic Panel.
Clearly, our model is highly stylized so as to zoom in on what we think
are key mechanisms of social exchange at the work floor. However, in doing
so, we have abstracted from some important features of reality. A first is-
sue is the ‘attribution effect’, implying that only true kindness of superiors
motivates workers. We feel confident that a Levine (1998)-type of model in
which workers update their beliefs about true feelings of their manager will
produce results that are close to the ones we present in this paper. A second
issue is that the current three-stage set-up does not fully reflect the dynamic
nature of the employment relation, where building reputation, the option to
quit or to fire, and other common themes in dynamic analyses may play a
role. None of these avenues is likely to affect the key results of this paper
qualitatively. Third, we have considered reciprocity on the side of the worker
only. Although not an uncommon assumption, we could also consider a case
where superiors too have reciprocal feelings. Lastly, we have presented a sim-
ple and highly tractable model, which may hide several subtle second-order
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effects that show up in a more general set up. An example of such an effect
is that stronger incentives for the worker make the manager more lenient,
since attention is less effective in stimulating worker’s effort.
What are the lessons of our model for management practice? Well, first
is that designers of organizations and stake holders should realize that giving
stronger incentives to workers is costly not only in that it potentially takes
away profits from the shareholders, but also in that it weakens the incentives
for senior management to put in sufficient effort. In practice, people manage-
ment by superiors may be a cheap way of motivating workers when compared
to monetary incentives. Hence, in times when managers’ bonus pay makes
them residual claimant on the workers’ output, reducing the bonus pay to
them and giving stronger incentives to the worker may be a very costly way
of achieving higher overall output. This may call for a strategy that incen-
tives should be increased in tandem throughout the organization and for both
workers and managers, as this circumvents the problems highlighted in this
paper.
Further, we have seen that promotion incentives can be a more efficient
instrument to induce effort when compared to bonus pay. The good thing
about committing to upward mobility within the organization is that these in-
centives for workers do not impair the monetary incentives for their superiors
— under the assumption that the latter do not create their own competitors.
Hence, the costs of flat organizations such as high-powered teams and (ex-
cessive use of) project management is that they force the organization to use
incentive schemes that are not only costly in terms of transferring a poten-
tially large share of the profits to workers, but also distort the incentives of
managers to provide knowledge transfer, coaching and, yes, attention.
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10 Tables and figures
Figure 1: Frequency distribution of reciprocity for those
individuals who get performance appraisal.
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Table 1: Summary statistics
Subgroup Frequency Subtotal
No performance appraisal 72% (8179)
Performance appraisal 28% (3159)
Appraisal has conse-
quences for:
Bonus
only
Promotion
only
Bonus
and Pro-
motion
Neither
Total 14%
(452)
25%
(803)
19%
(586)
42%
(1318)
100%
(3159)
Small firms (<100
employees)
14%
(102)
17%
(123)
12%
(84)
57%
(405)
100%
(714)
Large firms (≥100
employees)
14%
(316)
29%
(634)
22%
(481)
35%
(769)
100%
(2200)
Union members 15%
(96)
31%
(206)
18%
(120)
36%
(239)
100%
(661)
Non-union members 14%
(337)
24%
(552)
19%
(435)
43%
(1015)
100%
(2339)
Income ≤1500 euro,
fulltime workers
9%
(32)
11%
(40)
6%
(22)
75%
(282)
100%
(376)
Income >1500 euro,
fulltime workers
16%
(358)
29%
(624)
23%
(510)
32%
(696)
100%
(2188)
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Table 2: Effect of reciprocity on the probability of receiving
promotion incentives. (Robust standard errors in parentheses)
Dependent variable: Promotion incentives Promotion incentives
Sample:
Firm
size<100
Sample:
Firm
size≥100
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Reciprocity 0.154∗∗∗
(0.032)
0.100∗∗∗
(0.029)
0.227∗∗∗
(0.072)
0.139∗∗∗
(0.037)
Risk attitude -0.013
(0.013)
-0.005
(0.012)
-0.045∗
(0.027)
-0.002
(0.016)
Female -0.117∗
(0.068)
-0.197∗∗∗
(0.057)
-0.190
(0.152)
-0.105
(0.076)
Age 0.057∗∗∗
(0.021)
0.093∗∗∗
(0.015)
0.048
(0.041)
0.063∗∗
(0.025)
Age squared -0.001∗∗∗
(0.000)
-0.001∗∗∗
(0.000)
-0.001∗
(0.001)
-0.001∗∗∗
(0.000)
Years of education 0.005
(0.013)
0.111∗∗∗
(0.009)
-0.026
(0.032)
0.012
(0.015)
Tenure 0.002
(0.004)
0.025∗∗∗
(0.003)
-0.013
(0.009)
0.004
(0.004)
Part-time -0.178∗
(0.092)
-0.208∗∗
(0.081)
-0.106
(0.189)
-0.175
(0.107)
East-Germany -0.392∗∗∗
(0.072)
-0.533∗∗∗
(0.065)
-0.505∗∗∗
(0.143)
-0.364∗∗∗
(0.085)
Constant -2.499∗∗∗
(0.513)
-3.557∗∗∗
(0.365)
-2.227∗∗
(0.895)
-2.601∗∗∗
(0.560)
Firm size dummies Yes No Yes Yes
Industry dummies Yes No Yes Yes
Job status dummies Yes No Yes Yes
Observations 2726 2829 631 2088
Pseudo R2 0.228 0.097 0.246 0.207
Log likelihood -1452.96 -1761.42 -291.25 -1146.39
Reduction factor 0.369 0.362 0.372 0.372
∗∗∗,∗∗,∗ indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively.
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Table 3: Effect of reciprocity on the probability of receiving
promotion incentives when a limited-liability constraint binds.
(Robust standard errors in parentheses)
Dependent variable: Promotion incentives Promotion incentives
Sample:
Union members
Sample:
Income≤
1500 euro
Sample:
Income>
1500 euro
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Reciprocity 0.093
(0.073)
0.065
(0.064)
0.073
(0.093)
0.107∗∗∗
(0.035)
Risk attitude -0.007
(0.029)
0.007
(0.026)
-0.091∗∗
(0.039)
0.011
(0.014)
Female -0.050∗
(0.174)
-0.227
(0.139)
0.028
(0.185)
-0.162∗∗
(0.066)
Age 0.131∗∗∗
(0.050)
0.109∗∗
(0.043)
0.102∗∗
(0.049)
0.025
(0.022)
Age squared -0.002∗∗∗
(0.001)
-0.002∗∗∗
(0.000)
-0.001∗∗
(0.001)
-0.001∗∗
(0.000)
Years of education 0.002
(0.032)
0.0982∗∗∗
(0.023)
0.005
(0.042)
0.092∗∗∗
(0.011)
Tenure 0.005
(0.008)
0.026∗∗∗
(0.007)
-0.010
(0.021)
0.015∗∗∗
(0.004)
Part-time -0.168
(0.228)
-0.152
(0.190)
East-Germany -0.489∗∗∗
(0.160)
-0.706∗∗∗
(0.148)
-0.447∗∗
(0.200)
-0.380∗∗∗
(0.078)
Constant -2.321∗∗∗
(1.459)
-3.247∗∗∗
(1.007)
-2.600∗∗
(1.054)
-2.789∗∗∗
(0.641)
Firm size dummies Yes No Yes Yes
Industry dummies Yes No No No
Job status dummies Yes No No No
Observations 606 620 319 2087
Pseudo R2 0.267 0.096 0.084 0.082
Log likelihood -307.78 -388.49 -129.97 -1326.61
Reduction factor 0.364 0.358 0.389 0.364
∗∗∗,∗∗,∗ indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively
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Table 4: Effect of reciprocity on the probability of receiving
bonus pay. (Robust standard errors in parentheses)
Dependent variable: Bonus pay Bonus pay
Sample:
Firm
size<100
Sample:
Firm
size≥100
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Reciprocity -0.011
(0.044)
0.001
(0.042)
0.102
(0.092)
-0.056
(0.053)
Risk attitude 0.015
(0.019)
0.021
(0.018)
-0.031
(0.035)
0.003
(0.023)
Female -0.193∗∗
(0.094)
-0.362∗∗∗
(0.082)
-0.226
(0.186)
-0.159
(0.111)
Age 0.074∗∗∗
(0.027)
0.110∗∗∗
(0.02)
0.097∗∗
(0.048)
0.058∗
(0.034)
Age squared -0.001∗∗
(0.000)
-0.001∗∗∗
(0.000)
-0.001∗∗
(0.001)
-0.001
(0.000)
Years of education 0.043∗∗
(0.019)
0.058∗∗∗
(0.013)
0.060
(0.041)
0.029
(0.023)
Tenure 0.007
(0.005)
0.008∗
(0.004)
0.013
(0.010)
0.003
(0.006)
Part-time -0.182
(0.127)
-0.345∗∗∗
(0.119)
0.001
(0.231)
-0.276∗
(0.156)
East-Germany -0.094
(0.094)
-0.176∗∗
(0.086)
-0.216
(0.161)
-0.017
(0.120)
Constant -2.993∗∗∗
(0.649)
-3.761∗∗∗
(0.512)
-4.230∗∗∗
(1.145)
-2.930∗∗∗
(0.794)
Firm size dummies Yes No Yes Yes
Industry dummies Yes No Yes Yes
Job status dummies Yes No Yes Yes
Observations 1461 1474 448 1013
Pseudo R2 0.160 0.078 0.196 0.165
Log likelihood -714.88 -793.83 -186.17 -512.29
Reduction factor 0.3766 0.3785 0.3698 0.3883
∗∗∗,∗∗,∗ indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively.
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